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Metacognitive abilities, such as knowing we know something or that we made the wrong 
decision, can be powerful tools for adapting behaviour and accelerating learning. Apes, 
dolphins, and even rats demonstrate some such abilities; a new study provides evidence 
that human infants can too. 
 
It is only at around the age of three that children start to use correctly verbs such as “know”, 
“guess” and “remember” [1], and for this reason developmental psychologists thought for a 
long time that metacognition — the ability to reflect on one’s knowledge or memory — is not 
available to younger children. When a child starts using a word, however, is not a good 
indicator of when they acquire the underlying concept, which can happen many months 
earlier [2]. More importantly, many non-human species, including rats [3], have been shown 
to adapt their behaviour when faced with uncertainty, in ways that suggest they are able to 
access their knowledge states. It is therefore more reassuring than surprising that human 
infants are capable of no less: in this issue of Current Biology, Goupil and Kouider [4] report 
how they adapted paradigms previously used in animal studies to show that 12-month old and 
18-month-old human infants persist in their choices only when they are likely to have been 
correct (suggesting that they know that they know) and change their mind when they are 
likely to have been be wrong (an index of error detection). 
 Figure 1. Acting on knowledge and uncertainty. 
(A) Rats are more likely to restart a trial if they made an incorrect choice following an easy 
decision [3]. (B) Infants do not persist in their search when they made an incorrect choice 
following a short memory delay [4]. (C) Metacognitive abilities are inferred from a 
significant interaction between decision difficulty and confidence measures (for example, 
persistence time). 
 
Measuring metacognition without language 
When verbal reports on states of confidence or ignorance are unavailable, as with nonhuman 
animals and preverbal infants, researchers have had to creatively design non-verbal 
equivalents. One such proxy for confidence ratings is the persistence on a particular choice. 
To modulate confidence levels, the decision difficulty of a task is varied (Figure 1). In one of 
these paradigms, rats had to discriminate between two odours which indicated the position of 
a reward [3]. In some trials, the discrimination was made difficult by mixing the two odours. 
Rat behaviour in these trials was suggestive an appreciation of uncertainty. They persisted for 
longest in their choice when this choice was correct, in trials when the discrimination was 
easy; this was interpreted as reflecting confidence in their decision. They persisted the least 
when making incorrect choices on the same easy trials, as if aware that they had made an 
error. Wait times in the difficult trials were intermediate in duration, suggestive of low 
certainty, or “I don’t know” judgments. Neurons in the rat’s orbitofrontal cortex fired when 
the rat had made an incorrect choice, in easy trials, even before the correct outcome was 
revealed — a potential signature of error detection.  
For their first study, Goupil and Kouider [4] adapted this paradigm for use with 18-
month old infants (Figure 1). Response uncertainty was induced by asking children to 
indicate the location where they had seen a toy hidden after a variable delay. After they made 
a choice, the authors measured for how long children searched at the chosen location. Just as 
in the rodent study, children searched for shorter times when making a correct choice after a 
long than a short delay, but searched for even shorter times when making an incorrect choice 
after short delays. In a subsequent study, children were given the option to switch to another 
box after making their first choice, and again they switched most often when they had made 
an incorrect choice after a short delay. Finally, a more direct measure of acknowledging a 
wrong decision was captured using electroencephalography (EEG): a particular EEG 
component, the error related negativity (ERN), is observed in adults when they make an 
incorrect decision. Goupil and Kouider [4] measured an ERN-like response when infants 
oriented towards the incorrect side of the screen after the other side had been primed by the 
appearance of a face, when that face had been on the screen for long enough to be visible.  
 
The challenge of proving metacognitive abilities  
In a 2012 book dedicated to The Foundations of Metacognition, Sodian et al. [5] decried the 
paucity of developmental studies assessing the ontogeny of these abilities. Goupil and 
Kouider [4] have thus provided much needed new data on this difficult topic. Developmental 
psychologists’ avoidance of this topic is not at all surprising given the on-going debate about 
what constitutes satisfying non-verbal evidence for metacognition. As the term implies, 
metacognition occurs when a second computation has been carried out on a first cognitive 
process, such as a memory or a decision. Some researchers have argued that performance in 
all available paradigms claiming metacognitive processes can be explained based on the 
primary process — that is, the behaviour being a result of not remembering something, rather 
than of knowing that one does not remember [6,7]. 
The same concerns can be levied against the new findings of Goupil and Kouider [4]. 
The interpretation of their results rests on our acceptance that, when infants changed their 
minds about whether or where to search, it was because they were aware that they had chosen 
wrongly. It is not sufficient to argue that they just had a weaker memory trace of the object in 
the wrong-choice location (because they had no record of seeing the object there) because, 
during the longer delay times, when infant’s memory trace was presumably even weaker, 
they searched more persistently. But a possible alternative explanation is that, on the trials 
where infants were incorrect, they simply began searching earlier than their memory 
permitted (impulsively) but switched as soon as they remembered the real location of the 
object. This would not imply any meta-representation of their knowledge. Future studies 
could investigate whether memory retrieval follows rather than precedes choice in these 
incorrect trials. The same line of reasoning can be applied to the authors’ second experiment, 
where infants made a choice to continue with their initial search, or shift to a second box. A 
specific error related neural response measured in the third study might suggest that infants 
are, after all, able to acknowledge errors of decision. This interpretation is questionable as 
well, given that it is still a matter of debate whether the ERN really reflects error awareness 
in adults [8].  
 
Metacognition about the self and about the others 
But let’s say that Goupil and Kouider’s [4] demonstration really does provide convincing 
evidence for early metarepresentational abilities. After all, perhaps this is the most plausible 
interpretation given that infants of the same age are seemingly able to metarepresent the 
knowledge states of others [9]. If they have this metarepresentational ability, perhaps we 
should expect them to be able to turn such an ability inwards, especially if, as some believe, 
we have privileged access to our own mental states [10].  
But if infants are indeed metarepresenting their own knowledge, how do we reconcile 
this ability with evidence that infants between 12 and 18 months of age appear not to have a 
concept of the cognitive self that should logically be necessary for metarepresenting one’s 
own knowledge of absence thereof? The absence of a ‘cognitive self’ [11], typically inferred 
from failing to recognize themselves in the mirror, is thought to underlie the absence of 
things like autobiographical memory in young children. So if we accept that 12-month-olds 
have metacognitive awareness, are we also tacitly accepting that they have a concept of the 
self?  
 
What would infants gain from metacognition ? 
The search for infant metacognition will be helped by asking in which situations infants 
would most benefit from knowing they don’t know, as compared to simply not knowing. It 
has been suggested that knowing that one does not know might be necessary for promoting 
information-seeking behaviors, either through asking others for information, or searching 
oneself. Indeed, 20-months-olds asked for help when faced with the uncertainty of where an 
object was hidden [12]. In another study [13], 2.5 year olds, who had no prior knowledge 
about the container in which a reward had been hidden, first looked into the containers and 
then chose one of them.. However, others have argued that the use of specific information-
seeking behaviors that reduce uncertainty could be learned by association to the particular 
emotional or cognitive states accompanying uncertainty itself. Uncertainty has been shown to 
lead to increased arousal, resetting of neural states and stochastic behaviour [14], but there is 
arguably a difference between a feeling of uncertainty and knowing what that uncertainty is.  
Perhaps we should consider situations in which there is the need that infants 
communicate or make known their knowledge states to others. It is in these contexts that as 
adults we use metacognitive judgements, as when letting others know we don’t know where 
the theatre is so that they don’t follow us. A stronger test of metacognitive ability would then 
be to present infants with situations in which they need to consider whether someone else 
thinks the infants know something or not. We are not sure exactly what such a test might look 
like, but it might extricate us from the difficult task of isolating second-order, rather than 
first-order, representations as driving infants’ behaviour. Goupil and Kouider’s [4] paper is a 
real tour de force of experimentation on very challenging populations, but the quest for infant 
(and non-human) metacognition has only been reignited with this study. The experimental 
and theoretical challenges remain big but whatever the findings, this is an exciting field that 
lies ahead. 
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